Phase II clinical studies represent a critical point in determining drug costs, and phase II is a poor predictor of drug success: >30% of drugs entering phase II studies fail to progress, and >58% of drugs go on to fail in phase III.
6.6% of CV drugs entering phase I advance to market, 24% that enter phase II transition to phase III, and 45% that enter phase III result in a new drug application filing (4). These late phase failure rates probably underestimate failures for first-in-class agents because the reported rates include trials that examine new indications for already-approved drugs and drugs that replicate the mechanism of another successful agent (5) .
The flow of innovative agents to the marketplace is slowing significantly as the "low hanging fruit" of therapeutic targets appears to have been substantially harvested (6) . Fewer blockbuster drugs and first-in-class drugs are being developed that are both effective in broad patient populations and would: 1) reap enough returns to pay for their own development costs; 2) substantially cover the cost of trials for failed drugs together; and 3) make up for patent expirations on existing drugs (3) . New drugs increasingly target fewer indications, are more frequently used for second-and third-line therapy, apply to smaller patient populations, have smaller market interests, and produce a smaller margin in which to recoup costs. Drug companies are answering these challenges by focusing on therapies that are most likely to reach market approval rapidly, are less subject to pricing pressure once the market is reached, are less expensive to develop, and therefore, have higher potential to improve return on investment (7, 8) .
There are worries that drugs are being discarded too soon in clinical testing, either due to failure of trials to identify the right target patient population or due to commercial concerns rather than clinical concerns. Attention is turning to understanding why so few initially promising drugs fail to pass clinical testing and to reducing the time it takes for drugs that will ultimately be successful to pass through phases II and III. Phase II testing plays a pivotal role in drug development costs because so many agents "die" in phase II, and because successful completion of phase II is a poor predictor of whether a drug will complete phase III, the most expensive of clinical trials. As the CEO of GlaxoSmithKline pointed out, "if you stop failing so often, you massively reduce the cost of drug development" (7) . This review examines some aspects of the phase II problem and discusses adaptive trials and statistical challenges.
WHY DRUGS FAIL IN CLINICAL TRIALS
Phase II represents the first time in which a drug is tested in actual patients, ranging from 50 to 200 patients in most heart failure (HF) studies (9) . Failures in phase II testing overall usually occur because: 1) previously unknown toxic side effects occur (50%); 2) the trials show insufficient efficacy to treat the medical condition being tested (30%); or 3) commercial viability looks poor (15%) (10) . For CV drugs, 44% of late trial failures are due to poor efficacy and 24% are due to safety concerns (11) . Phase II trials face many challenges due to small sample size and choice of study design. In addition, the relatively short duration of phase II trials makes it difficult to identify long-term side effects and outcomes.
BIOMARKERS AS SURROGATE ENDPOINTS. Singlearm phase II (SA-II) studies are usually insufficient to test long-term outcomes because clear indications of the success or failure of a treatment can take months or years, and would extend trial times and cost (12) .
Phase II studies instead increasingly rely on surrogate clinical or biochemical markers to provide "interim" data about safety and efficacy, allowing faster drug approval conditioned on continued post-marketing safety and efficacy studies (9) . In HF phase II trials, increasing emphasis has been placed on clinical biomarkers such as functional capacity, left ventricular ejection fraction, and chemical biomarkers of HF (e.g., B-type natriuretic peptide levels). However, validating that a given biomarker is an appropriate surrogate study endpoint is complex and requires compelling evidence (13) .
The use of biomarkers has been encouraged by the FDA, which has now established means by which to qualify biomarkers for use in drug development, but there is a lack of validated biomarkers at this time (14) (15) (16) .
Commercial development and validation of biomarkers is slow, because development of robust and meaningful biomarkers is both time-consuming and extremely expensive (Figures 1 and 2 ) (17) . Biomarkers can also fail in development, just as drugs fail in clinical trials. As with drugs, biomarker failures carry both scientific and commercial consequences-if the risks of failure are too high, research to yield successful biomarkers and therapeutics simply will not be undertaken or may be terminated prematurely.
It is unclear how well biomarkers accurately predict positive patient (and trial) outcomes. Wong et al. Even so, no significant difference was found in probability of success when phase II studies in which biomarkers were used for patient selection and/or as an indicator of therapeutic efficacy or toxicity were compared with trials that did not use biomarkers (18, 19) . 
Adaptive Clinical Trials and laropiprant, which was demonstrated to raise high-density lipoprotein, not only found no clinical effect on CV outcomes in a trial for U.S. approval that involved >25,000 patients, but had significant toxic side effects. The drug was not approved in the United States, and the drug maker began warning overseas doctors to stop prescribing it (27, 28) . Consider a study finding in favor of a drug effect for which the p value is 0.05, a common significance level set in clinical trials. The p value is not the probability of mistakenly rejecting the null hypothesis (i.e., the odds of wrongfully attributing an effect to the drug when there is none), but rather is the probability that a random sampling error could lead to the difference that is observed. A low p value indicates that the data are unlikely to have occurred in the presence of a true null, but the p value does not evaluate: 1) whether the null is actually true, that is, there actually is no drug effect, but the study sample was unusual or flawed; and 2) whether the null hypothesis is false. In the case of our drug, the correct conclusion is that there is a 5% chance that the apparent effect shown in the study is due to a random sampling error, regardless of whether other features of the study are flawed. The odds of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis (and therefore incorrectly concluding the drug has an effect when it does not) in a study with a p value of 0.05 is at least to 23% and typically closer to 50%. Even at a p value of 0.01, the odds of incorrectly deciding the drug has an effect are still 7% to 15% (30) . Timelines for development and validation of biomarkers by type, as estimated by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (17).
*This number is arrived at using the binomial formula to calculate the probability of having a zero (0) FDR at a 5% (p ¼ 0.05) significance level for 20 tests. The odds of a zero FDR is approximately 36%, and therefore, the odds of a false positive is 64%.
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significantly from the at-large phase III target popu- SA-II trials using historical controls do not account for the heterogeneity of real-world patients for whom the treatment will be targeted and assume that the study patients are identical to historical patients. The true success rates of a drug tested in SA-II design against historical controls can only be incompletely known. This is because even a small variance (e.g., 5%) of the actual control success rate away from the historical success rate rockets the false positive rate in single-arm studies by 2-to 3-fold (34 Dose-finding After interim analysis, a randomized trial with multiple dosing arms assigns more patients to dose groups of higher interest.
Hypothesis
After interim analysis, the study hypothesis is altered (e.g., a prespecified swap of primary and secondary endpoints).
Sequential or group sequential
After interim analysis, adaptations include pre-specified options of changing sample size, modification of existing treatment arms, elimination or addition of treatment arms, changes in endpoints, changes in randomization schedules.
Randomization
Randomization is adjusted after interim analysis so that patients enrolled later in the study have a higher probability of assignment to a treatment arm that appeared successful earlier. In ADs, the goal is to learn from accumulating data in the trial and apply what is learned as quickly as possible in a prospectively specified way during the trial itself to hone flexible aspects of the study while it is still ongoing. ADs can be classified as prospective, continuously adjusted or concurrent (ad hoc), and retrospective (9, 42, 48) . In prospective ADs, there is a pre-specified protocol to alter aspects of the study, such as size, follow-up period, and clinical endpoints following interim data analysis. This might lead to early termination of a study based on futility or unacceptable toxicity, or, alternatively, might require a change in sample size. A platform study or master protocol design is a type of adaptive trial in which multiple treatment arms are simultaneous studies, and interim analysis allows early termination of various arms due to futility or lack of efficacy (49) .
Concurrent or ad hoc study designs allow flexibility to alter multiple parameters in a study in a pre-specified way based on interim results. In ad hoc design, investigators are allowed to hone their hypothesis Van Norman
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Adaptive Clinical Trials AD is complex, must be undertaken carefully to minimize bias, and tends to draw greater regulatory scrutiny. In 2006, the FDA strongly recommended
ADs to address the decline in innovative medical products being submitted for approval (47) . FDs have been criticized as being subject to both more perceived and more actual bias, and present more complex challenges to regulators (58, 59) . However, such designs could theoretically speed study efficiency, reduce the number of subjects needed (thus, saving time and money), and expose fewer patients to ineffective or even harmful treatment by allowing intra-trial adjustment of pre-determined parameters.
ARE AD TRIALS MORE ETHICAL?
Randomization is believed to enhance the validity of clinical research.
However, many researchers now question whether traditional randomization is actually ethical. Asking a patient with a serious medical condition to submit to randomization is only ethical if the investigator is truly uncertain about the efficacy of the 2 study arms.
Zelen (60) 
